From: Konstantin Osipov <kostja@tarantool.org> To: tarantool-patches@freelists.org Cc: georgy@tarantool.org Subject: [tarantool-patches] Re: [security 2/3] security: Refactor reads from systems spaces Date: Sun, 13 May 2018 15:49:18 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180513124918.GA10552@atlas> (raw) In-Reply-To: <0c1d9e810129869e39003ca696de774a4d4f7a09.1522308989.git.imarkov@tarantool.org> * Ilya Markov <imarkov@tarantool.org> [18/03/29 12:10]: > +const uint32_t PRIV_WRDA = PRIV_W | PRIV_D | PRIV_A | PRIV_R; > + > static bool > vspace_filter(struct space *source, struct tuple *tuple) What did you need this for? > + if (PRIV_WRDA & cr->universal_access) > + return true; > + if (source->access[cr->auth_token].effective & PRIV_R) > + return true; Stray change. > - return uid == cr->uid || owner_id == cr->uid; > + return uid == cr->uid || owner_id == cr->uid || uid == PUBLIC; What is this change for? > + /* If user has global alter, drop privilege > + * she may access all privileges > + */ > + if (PRIV_WRDA & cr->universal_access) > + return true; The comment only talks about global alter/drop, what about global 'write'? Why did you include it into the list? > + if (source->access[cr->auth_token].effective & PRIV_R) > + return true; > + const char *type; > + uint32_t obj_id; > + if ((type = tuple_field_cstr(tuple, BOX_PRIV_FIELD_OBJECT_TYPE)) == NULL || > + tuple_field_u32(tuple, BOX_PRIV_FIELD_OBJECT_ID, &obj_id) != 0) > + return false; > + return grantor_id == cr->uid || grantee_id == cr->uid || > + (strncmp(type, "role", 4) == 0 && obj_id == PUBLIC); What is this for? > + uint32_t effective = sequence->access[cr->auth_token].effective; > + return sequence->def->uid == cr->uid || > + (PRIV_WRDA & effective); Stray changes make things harder to follow. -- Konstantin Osipov, Moscow, Russia, +7 903 626 22 32 http://tarantool.io - www.twitter.com/kostja_osipov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-13 12:49 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-03-29 7:36 [tarantool-patches] [security 0/3] System space access check lists Ilya Markov 2018-03-29 7:36 ` [tarantool-patches] [security 1/3] box: Add system view for _sequence system space Ilya Markov 2018-03-29 7:37 ` [tarantool-patches] [security 2/3] security: Refactor reads from systems spaces Ilya Markov 2018-05-13 12:49 ` Konstantin Osipov [this message] 2018-03-29 7:37 ` [tarantool-patches] [security 3/3] security: Refactor system space access checks Ilya Markov 2018-04-03 14:01 ` [tarantool-patches] Re: [security 0/3] System space access check lists Georgy Kirichenko
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